“FOOD WILL WIN THE WAR”:
MOTOR TRUCKS AND THE FARM-TO-TABLE
POSTAL DELIVERY PROGRAM, 1917-1918

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It was a Wednesday night in March 1918. The United States was at war and, while many of the nation’s soldiers were overseas fighting in that conflict, the Motor Truck Club of America gathered in New York City for its largest-ever annual dinner meeting.1

James I. Blakslee, the Fourth Assistant Postmaster General, addressed that group. While doing so, he made a surprise announcement about a town 180 miles always called Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The U.S. Post Office Department, Blakslee informed the 200 Motor Truck Club members in attendance, had just put that town in southeastern Pennsylvania on the map of suburban New York.2

Blakslee’s news about Lancaster was not the result of some Houdini-worthy magic nor did it stem from a farfetched redistricting of state lines. As Blakslee further explained in his remarks that night, a motor truck carrying about 2900 pounds of farm produce had left Lancaster at 4:14 that morning. That vehicle made its way to New York City’s post office building at 23rd street and Eighth Avenue at 4:17 that afternoon.3

Blakslee could not stress enough the significance of that 12-hour trek from the heart of Pennsylvania Dutch Country to America’s largest city. That mail-delivery experiment, he told his audience, was “a convincing illustration of improved efficiency which the Post Office Department is endeavoring to establish in the farm-to-table food movement.”4

That farm-to-table movement was an ambitious postal initiative, which took place during President Woodrow Wilson’s administration, seeking to directly transport produce from rural areas to cities. The program entailed picking up farm-fresh products – butter, eggs, poultry, vegetables, to name a few – and taking them as directly and quickly as possible to urban destinations.5

This program was conceived and launched in peacetime, but it took on additional significance during America’s 18-month involvement during what we know today as World War I. In the course of that bloody conflict, the experimental motor truck routes set up as part of that program were seen by many as important to the nationwide food conservation campaign.

The origins of the farm-to-table postal delivery initiative took shape about two decades earlier. Rural Free Delivery, which started out on a trial basis in 1896 and became permanent in 1902, proved to be a widespread and welcome service that brought mail directly to rural residents.6

During President William Howard Taft’s time in the White House, Rural Free Delivery was enlarged to include Parcel Post Service. That service, officially launched in the waning days of the Taft Administration in early 1913, allowed the shipment of packages that could not be delivered through regular mail within rural communities. The service turned out to be highly popular; in its first six months alone, approximately 300 million parcels were handled.7

Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster General for the fledgling Wilson Administration, sought to capitalize even further on Rural Free Delivery’s dramatic success. One way to accomplish that was an experiment, implemented in 1914, encouraging farmers to export more of their goods via the mail to consumers in the city.8

This experiment focused on a perceived gap in the existing Rural Free Delivery system: while farm families extensively used the parcel post service to request and receive such items as newspapers, magazines, and mail-order merchandise, there was unmet marketing possibility in the goods that could just as easily flow from the country to the city. As a department spokesman explained, “The Postmaster
General has the firm conviction that this plan is the one thing necessary to enable the people of this country to enjoy the potential benefits of the parcel post.\textsuperscript{9}

The program’s first year was on the whole promising, with 26 large cities selected for experimental delivery routes. Basically, postmasters in rural areas compiled lists of farmers and others wishing to sell their products to city residents by way of parcel post. Those postmasters would then forward the lists to their urban counterparts, who in turn shared the information through such means as letter carriers going door to door and posted advertisements. Ultimately, the urban consumer could place orders with his or her local post office and then await the arrival of farm-fresh products at home.\textsuperscript{10}

The Post Office Department, by serving as the conduit between producers and buyers, hoped to profit from business that most likely otherwise would have gone to such middlemen as general stores, express companies, and railroads. A lot of emphasis, though, was placed on how the farmers themselves could benefit from this mail-delivery undertaking.

“Every possible thing has been done to give the farmer an equal chance to compete with the corner grocery store on equal terms,” reported an April 1915 article entitled “Butter from the Post Office” in \textit{The Independent}. “Special fast auto service is used in many cities to effect immediate delivery of perishable goods.”\textsuperscript{11}

An example of this transportation service could be seen in Cleveland, Ohio, where in the fall of 1914 the postmaster obtained five new automobiles to facilitate deliveries from farms in the region.\textsuperscript{12}

By 1916, the groundwork was laid for the program’s expansion. A joint congressional resolution that summer authorized new routes, and postal officials began planning accordingly.\textsuperscript{13} Meanwhile, however, the United States found itself being drawn more deeply into the war in Europe.

The nation formally entered that brutal conflict on April 6, 1917, when Congress declared war on Germany.\textsuperscript{14} President Wilson, in a subsequent address to the American people, appealed to the nation’s farmers for help with food conservation efforts. He asserted, “Without abundant food, alike for the armies and the peoples now at war, the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked will break down and fail... Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure, rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations.”\textsuperscript{15}

With those words, Wilson voiced the need to produce and preserve ample food for the duration of the war. The conservation of food became one of the most crucial goals on the homefront and, in terms of wartime mobilization efforts, among the most far-reaching. U.S. Food Administrator (and future president) Herbert Hoover firmly and consistently exhorted his fellow Americans not to waste food so that enough of it could be shipped overseas to feed American troops and others.

Under Hoover’s leadership, the Food Administration used every means, medium, and method possible to promote its message with the public and make sure that everyone did what they could to ensure the availability of adequate rations abroad. Meatless Mondays and wheatless Wednesdays became a regular part of each person’s calendar. “Food Will Win the War” was a familiar rallying cry, and posters and signs carrying that mantra and others blanketed the nation.

A host of likeminded slogans, which regularly showed up in newspapers, included:
- “Don’t let your horse be more patriotic than you are – eat a dish of oatmeal!”
- “Wheatless days in America make sleepless nights in Germany.”
- “U-boats and wastefulness are twin enemies.”
- “Serve beans by all means.”
- “The Battle Cry of Feed ’Em.”

As Wilson underscored, however, a special burden was placed on farmers when it came to this entire campaign. They were under pressure, stronger than ever before, to not only produce enough food but also make sure that as much of it as possible went to market without rotting or simply going unused.\textsuperscript{16}
The Post Office Department, having already received authorization for more farm-to-table routes, stood ready to help accomplish those aims. Fourth Assistant Postmaster General Blakslee, who both dreamed and talked big anyway when it came to motorized transportation’s potential role in mail delivery, pushed for motor trucks rather than automobiles on those new routes.

A total of eight motor truck routes came into existence after postal officials wrestled extensively with logistics and unsuccessfully sought to secure additional funds for the endeavor. The routes, located mostly in the Middle Atlantic region, took effect between December 1917 and June 1918. There were specifically situated between:

- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Atlantic City, New Jersey
- Baltimore, Maryland, and Solomons Island, Maryland
- Washington, DC, and Leonardtown, Maryland
- Washington, DC, and Baltimore, Maryland
- Baltimore, Maryland, and Lancaster, Pennsylvania
- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC
- Savannah, Georgia, and Statesboro, Georgia
- Columbus, Ohio, and Zanesville, Ohio

The Post Office Department, which kept thorough records of all expenses for this part of the farm-to-table program, announced that the net profit for these routes in their first few months of operation was substantial.  

In addition, Blakslee stressed how at least some of these routes provided essential transportation services that could not be easily duplicated. “There is no rail or water transportation possible between Baltimore and Solomon’s Island nor between Washington and Leonardtown,” he offered as an example of this, “and there are over 1,000 similar localities east of the Mississippi River.”

Overall, though, the most salient feature of these motor trucks was how they could pick up and deliver larger-than-before quantities of farm goods for city residents. The Lancaster-New York City test run during this time further confirmed that advantage. That shipment was taken, within 45 minutes after reaching the New York City post office, to the customer – a produce dealer named Harry Atlas. His order, incidentally, included the following:

- 400 newly hatched chicks
- 18,000 fresh eggs
- 200 pounds of honey
- 500 pounds of butter
- 500 pounds of smoked sausage

This experimental trip was the longest postal run of its kind up to that time. The trip was also noteworthy due to the truck’s comparatively few stops in transit while delivering the produce to New York City from a rural area over 100 miles away. That night at the dinner meeting of the Motor Truck Club of America, New York’s Secretary of State Francis Hugo called the test run “an epoch in the history of the United States and the world.”

Epoch or not, that test run and other aspects of the motor truck farm-to-table routes did receive positive public notice. This was because the whole enterprise fit in well with the food-conservation ethos that dominated the war.

The service, to be sure, was far from perfect. It could be expensive, first of all. Other periodic drawbacks included trucks breaking down and food getting spoiled in transit.

Farmers nonetheless embraced the service, and not just because of how much produce the motor trucks could carry. Many farmhands who normally might take produce elsewhere were serving in the
military or performing other wartime duties, and the Post Office Department’s program helped mitigate that manpower shortage.22

Blakslee emphasized those linkages with the larger war effort. As he noted in an April 1918 New Times article, “Government profit in any branch of the postal service is a good thing, but at the present time that takes second place when compared to the necessity for food production on the biggest possible scale. And do not forget that we have less men than ever to produce the food.”23

Throughout the U.S. involvement in World War I, the Farm-to-Table postal delivery service was widely praised in the press. Hoover hailed the service as an important means of saving food.24

Blakslee, trying to seize this momentum, promoted a nationwide network of profitable motor truck routes. Blakslee reasoned that the surplus he felt would surely result from those routes could be used to improve the roads on which the vehicles traveled. Virginia’s Senator Claude Swanson, in fact, introduced a bill authorizing the Postmaster General to establish such routes and to use half the gross revenues from those routes for road improvements. That bill died in a Senate committee, but in July 1918 Congress did appropriate a smaller amount for a few more experimental routes.25

Just a few months later, however, the armistice with Germany was signed. The Treaty of Versailles in June the following year would officially end the state of war, but the armistice halted the actual fighting.26

In the post-armistice atmosphere, Blakslee and others in the department found it tougher to extend – let alone maintain – the farm-to-table postal delivery program and in particular its motor truck routes. The once solid public support for that program faded away and the usage of those services fell off markedly. Blakslee worked hard to salvage the initiative, but it increasingly became a lost cause. Congress ultimately eliminated the program in 1920, and subsequent attempts to bring it back later that decade and the next went nowhere.27

The reasons for the initiative’s rapid demise are diverse and deep-seated. One likely cause is that the high-pitch wartime fervor bolstering the initiative quickly evaporated once the guns in Europe fell silent. Many farmers, for example, had embraced the program out of economic necessity and also because their president exhorted them to help save the world; with the exigencies of war now past, those same farmers and their prospective consumers were far less inclined to tolerate any inconveniences that came with the motor truck service.28

There was also competition from the private sector that blossomed more fully in the war’s aftermath. A number of entities moving into the delivery business offered to get the job done more cheaply. A case in point was the Maryland-based Farmers’ Cooperative Association Harford County, which operated a lucrative franchise transporting farm goods to Baltimore. Then there were the self-service grocery markets, which first sprang up at this time and gave many consumers yet more food-shopping alternatives.29

Another factor was unquestionably the tense relations between the Post Office Department and Congress. It would be an understatement to say that Blakslee never quite endeared himself with the lawmakers on Capitol Hill. He could come across as hostile, self-righteous, and even naïve.30

Back in 1916, several senators demanded Blakslee’s ouster after he charged members of the Senate Post Office Committee with inordinately favoring the railroads when it came to rural mail service. That uproar died down, and Blakslee kept his job, only after the committee chairman accepted his letter of apology.31

Despite that close call, Blakslee continued his often confrontational approach with Congress. He did not do himself or the motor truck routes any favors during the war, for instance, when he once characterized a proposed congressional appropriation for that service as “ridiculously small.”32 By 1920,
with the war over and the Wilson Administration’s days numbered, Congress had even less reason than before to indulge Blakslee and keep his farm-to-table cause alive.

Individually, any of these factors would have been enough to seriously hobble the farm-to-table postal delivery program in the wake of the armistice; collectively, they sealed that initiative’s fate.

The initiative is worth remembering, though. First of all, it embodied both the spirit and the substance of food conservation efforts during World War I. It also underscored how the Post Office Department’s commitment to mobilization efforts went well beyond just plastering “Food Will Win the War” announcements in post offices.33

The initiative can also be seen in an even larger sense as a case study of postal operations in periods of national urgency, as well as a cautionary tale about how a wartime enterprise does not always survive the peace that follows.

Finally, the initiative exemplifies how any major war’s impact can last long after its battles have ceased. A key legacy of World War I was the dynamic growth of American highways and surface transportation in the decades ever since. When the United States entered that conflict, the railroads constituted the preeminent form of transportation. The trains were soon overwhelmed, however, by the demands of moving vital supplies throughout a nation getting mobilized for war. Consequently, more and more trucks were produced and deployed to fill that logistical vacuum and guarantee that crucial shipments reached their destinations.

Trucks came into their own during World War I and their increased numbers, coupled with the equally dramatic growth in automobiles, made it imperative that highways be better able to accommodate heavier traffic. The war therefore set the stage for major long-range projects that would create the stronger, wider, and smoother roads we still use today.34

The Post Office Department, through such endeavors as the wartime farm-to-table program, very much reflected this transportation trend. Interestingly, it did so under a postmaster general usually deemed to be among the worst in American history. Burleson’s tenure was without a doubt stormy, for reasons ranging from the harsh treatment of the rank-and-file employees to his heavy-handed enforcement of the Espionage Act. 35

One of the more progressive postal achievements during this time, however, was arguably that expanded use of motorized transportation. That chapter of postal history is critical to understanding how the agency went from possessing a handful of horseless carriages to becoming custodian of the world’s largest vehicular fleet.36

Blakslee, for all of his own professional and personal shortcomings, was the pivotal pioneer in that transformation. He readily grasped the possibilities of motorized vehicles -- especially those trucks he pressed into service for the farm-to-table program – and the highways upon which they traveled.

“I may be considered visionary and a dreamer when I assert that the use of the highways is the only present, practicable solution of inadequate or inefficient transportation,” he wrote in February 1919, “and I do not mean the use of the highway in the form in which it is now or has been used.”37

In some respects, Blakslee may have been too farsighted at the expense of shorter-term practical considerations. He unquestionably overreached, for example, when trying to sustain those motor truck routes after the outbreak of peace dried up demand for them. He was also more quixotic than pragmatic in attempting to sell his dream of a nationwide web of those routes to a skeptical Congress.

Overall, though, Blakslee foresaw more than many of his contemporaries the potential of roads and surface transportation. “Motor truck postal service will ultimately be one of the biggest things in the history of the Post Office Department,” he proclaimed a few weeks after that one truck’s historic run between Lancaster and New York City.38 Those words, and the animating force behind them, help define
the enduring legacy and lessons of both the farm-to-table experiment and the long-ago war in which that program’s motor trucks thrived.

NOTES

2 Ibid.
8 Fuller, RFD, 234; Ho, From Farm to Table, 1; “Food by Parcel Post,” The Washington Post, 23 March 1914.
9 Ibid.
10 Lee, From Farm to Table, 1, 2; “Farm-to-Table Plan Appeals to Nation,” The New York Times, 30 August 1914; “Wider Use of Parcel Post in U.S. Now Seen,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 October 1914.
11 Quoted in Ho, From Farm to Table, 2.
18 “Motor Trucks Pay for Parcel Post,” The New York Times, 30 June 1918. See also “J.I. Blakslee Praises Auto Trucks in Service of the P.O. Department; Stimulate the Production of Food,” The Washington Post, 7 April 1918; and James I. Blakslee to W.G. Howard, 7 April 1919, Box 2, Entry 185, RG 28, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
20 Quoted in Fuller, RFD, 242.
21 FHWA, America’s Highways, 1776-1976, 100; Fuller, RFD 243; Ho, From Farm to Table, 5.
22 FHWA, America’s Highways, 1776-1976, 100.
23 “Farm-to-Table Post,” The New York Times, 14 April 1918. See also “J.I. Blakslee Praises Auto Trucks in Service of the P.O. Department; Stimulate the Production of Food,” The Washington Post, 7 April 1918.
24 FHWA, America’s Highways, 1776-1976, 100.


28 Fuller, RFD, 243-246; FHWA, America’s Highways, 1776-1976, 100; Ho, From Farm to Table, 5.

29 FHWA, America’s Highways, 1776-1976, 98, 100; Ho, From Farm to Table, 5; “War’s Effect on Automobile Trade,” The New York Times, 17 November 1918.

30 Fuller, RFD, 246; Ho, From Farm to Table, 5.

31 Bruns, Motorized Mail, 60; “Rouses Senator’s Ire,” The Washington Post, 28 May 1916; “Blakslee Apologizes to Senators,” The New York Times, 6 September 1916; Albert S. Burleson to U.S. Senator John H. Bankhead, 24 May 1916, Box 1, Entry 185, RG 28, NARA; typewritten statement (undated) from James I. Blakslee defending himself against congressional criticisms, Box 1, Entry 185, RG 28, NARA.

32 “Farm-to-Table Parcel Post,” The New York Times, 14 April 1918.


37 James I. Blakslee to Albert G. Metz, 28 February 1919, Box 2, Entry 185, RG 28, NARA.

38 “Farm-to-Table Parcel Post,” The New York Times, 14 April 1918.